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Housing policy toward the rental sector in Italy: 













We study the distributive effects on Italian households of the three most relevant housing 
subsidies targeted to renters: a national rent supplement scheme introduced in the context of the 
reform that liberalised the rental market in the late 1990s, a tax credit for renters that has been 
recently strengthened, and the implicit economic support given to tenants in the social housing 
sector, through below-market rents. The analysis is performed on data from the Eu-Silc survey 
for Italy and, in the case of the housing allowances, also on register data from some of the largest 
Italian towns. We consider in particular the ability of these schemes to target low income 
households and their effects on the overall levels of poverty and inequality. Results from our 
analysis show a good targeting but very limited effect on social protection, with the partial 
exception of social housing. 
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Although Italy’s home ownership rate is among the highest in the European countries, the rented 
sector still accounts for about 20% of the housing stock occupied as a main residence. Social 
housing has a marginal role, comprising about one fifth of rented dwellings. The incidence of the 
whole rental sector has halved during the last fourty years (D’Alessio & Gambacorta, 2007). 
Private supply of rental homes fell dramatically after a law regulating rent levels was introduced 
in 1978. To some extent, many households have been forced to become home owners as a way to 
get a secure and affordable dwelling. The rent control regime, largely ineffective in both 
protecting tenants and in allowing reasonable returns to landlords, was progressively dismantled 
during the 1990s, when the rental market had already collapsed. The private rental sector was 
then gradually liberalized through a voluntary rent-bargaining system, and with the survival of 
some general rules on tenants’ protection that enable the current regime to be inserted within the 
broad range of “second-generation” or “soft” rent control systems (Arnott, 1998).  
Over the last decade, the share of households living in rented homes has remained stable. 
However, their economic conditions have worsened, both in absolute terms and in comparison 
with those of homeowners, in consequence of two simultaneous long-term trends: firstly, from 
1998 to 2007 housing prices and rents substantially increased (Rondinelli & Veronese, 2010) and 
have not returned to past levels, owing to the ongoing crisis; secondly, disposable incomes of 
Italian households have been increasing very slowly at least since the mid-1990s. Those who 
could afford to buy their homes have already made the leap from renting to owning, benefiting 
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also from a prolonged period of low interest rates, so that the condition of renters is now much 
more closely associated with the presence of a low disposable income than thirty years ago.  
Since the increase in house prices and rent levels has been much faster than the income growth, 
many households still living in rented dwellings do not possess enough resources to purchase a 
house. The demand for rents is also fuelled by robust immigration flows, both from southern 
regions towards the North and from abroad. However, the supply of dwellings for rent is limited, 
for a series of reasons, most relevantly by the shortage of new social housing iniatives, high tax 
rates on rental incomes, the sluggishness of the judicial system in cases of arrears, and conflicts 
between tenants and landlords.  
For many households, these social and economic factors have generated a problem of rental 
affordability (D’Alessio & Gambacorta, 2007). It is therefore important to ask how public 
policies intervene to protect low-income renters and what results they have so far obtained in 
Italy. Equity considerations are not the only reasons that could justify public intervention in the 
rental market. There are also valid efficiency motivations. The availability of dwellings at 
affordable rents guarantees the mobility of the labour force across cities and thus favours the 
growth of the more dynamic areas. Furthermore, many researchers have suggested that the 
insufficient supply of affordable dwellings may represent an important factor explaining why in 
Italy and in other Mediterranean countries the young generations tend to remain in their original 
families much longer than in the rest of Europe (Bernardi, 2005; Facchini & Villa, 2005; 
Mencarini & Tanturri, 2006; Mulder & Billari, 2010).  
In this paper we study to what extent the economic conditions of Italian renters are improved by 
three housing policy instruments: social housing, guaranteeing rents much lower than in the 
private market; a tax credit for renters in the context of the personal income tax; a housing 
allowance aimed at reducing the burden of rents in the private market for households with low 
incomes. The distributive impact of these three schemes is evaluated using a sample 
representative of the whole Italian population and, in the case of the housing benefit, also with 
the help of register data that we have collected from some of the biggest Italian cities.  
From a housing policy evaluation perspective, the analysis of the outcomes of these three 
instruments also enables us to focus on the consequences of the shift from supply-side (social 
housing) to demand-side instruments (direct and indirect dedicated transfers) in Italy.  
Previous research in this field for Italy has concentrated on the effects of the imputed rents on 
poverty and income distribution. D’Ambrosio and Gigliarano (2007) find that adding imputed 
rents from all dwellings (rented, owned or with sub-market rents) on cash incomes of all 
households produces a reduction in both poverty and inequality. Marical et al. (2006) focus on 
social housing, and similarly find a small but significant effect on inequality. With respect to the 
paper by Paulus et al. (2009), that  considers the impact of three public benefits in kind (health, 
education and housing) in some EU countries, we find for Italy a greater effect of social housing 
on income distribution. From these results, this paper makes two main steps: we consider the 
distributive impact of all the forms of transfer targeted to tenants, not only social housing, and 
use two complementary kinds of data to provide further evidence on the effects of the rent 
supplement scheme: not only a sample survey representative of the whole country, but also 
administrative data for nine of the major Italian cities. To the best of our knowledge, no previous 
studies are available on the outcomes of the rent supplement scheme in Italy, but only some 
regional reports (see Lungarella, 2006 for a review).  
The main institutional characteristics of the three schemes are described in the next section. Then 
we present a distributive analysis carried out with the help of a tax-benefit microsimulation 
model developed upon the Eu-Silc data. The further section discusses the effects of the rent 
supplement scheme using register data. Lastly, some conclusions are drawn.  
 
 
Direct and indirect transfers to renters in Italy 
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 Social housing  
 
In the European context, Italy emerges as one of the countries where social housing is less 
developed and, more generally, public expenditure for housing is lower: according to Eurostat 
data, only 0.1% of total social expenditure is devoted to housing
1 and less than 5% of all 
households live in social housing. The public sector is almost the exclusive provider of social 
housing, now decentralised to local authorities (regions and municipalities).  
The limited dimensions of social housing supply are not wholly due to recent reduced public 
investments in this sector. What characterizes this sector is the constant tendency of the Italian 
governments to privatize public dwellings, given that ruling parties have sought to create a large 
class of owners, politically moderate, and Italian households have always expressed a great 
preference for owning over renting.  
Starting from the 70s, the implementation of social housing programmes has been subject to a 
strong decentralization process. Currently, Regions, municipal authorities and the publicly 
owned local social housing institutes are involved in the construction of new dwellings and in the 
definition of the admittance rules, according to criteria of social and economic needs. Actually,  
and particularly in the biggest urban areas, the need to find an accommodation for households 
that have been evicted within the private rental sector — end of lease evictions were a major 
problem during the 1980s and the 1990s — has led to the systematic use of exceptional criteria 
for the allocation of dwellings that has partially altered the distributive aims of social housing 
(Olagnero, 2002), since having been evicted has been given priority over other criteria of social 
and economic need.   
Many households remain in a social housing dwelling for their entire life, and sometimes the flat 
is passed on to the heirs. The low turnover rate can be explained not only by organizational 
deficiencies, but also by the concentration in the social housing sector of many households with 
relevant social and economic problems. The development of poverty traps is therefore a concrete 
risk. Since the supply of private rental homes is scarce and costly, the preservation of the flat is a 
strategic resource that must be kept and, if possible, passed on to subsequent generations.  
 
 
Tax credit for tenants  
 
The taxation of the main residence for homeowners is based on the cadastral value of the 
dwelling, well below market values. It has also been progressively lightened over the last few 
years. Since 2001, the imputed rent is, for example, fully deductible from taxable income, like 
the capital gains from the sale of the main residence. Further, in 2008 the government exempted 
the main residence also from the local property tax, which landlords still have to pay on their 
dwellings, and which is likely to be translated to their tenants. In order to offset (at least partly) 
these tax reductions for homeowners and to mitigate the effects of the liberalization of the rental 
market, a tax credit from the personal income tax in favour of taxpayers living in a privately 
rented dwelling was introduced at the beginning of the new millennium. It was originally 
confined to “regulated” rental contracts, one of the contractual forms that the 1998 reform 
created, based on agreements between local associations of tenants and landlords. These 
regulated contracts introduce some tax concessions to landlords, if they agree to charge rents 
lower than the prevailing market levels, but also for tenants. In 2008 the tax credit was extended 
to all tenants in the private market. Different amounts have been set according to the type of the 
contract: for free contracts the credit is 300 euro for personal incomes lower than 15,493 euro, 
and 150 for incomes in the range 15,493-30,983. In the case of “regulated” contracts, the tax 
credit is, for the same income brackets, 460 and 230 euro respectively. For tenants aged less than 
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30 years the maximum amount of the credit can reach 950 euro. Households cannot apply for 
both the rent supplement scheme described below and this tax concession. 
The credit depends on the personal income of the taxpayer who has signed the rent contract, not 
on the economic condition of the household or the number of family members. It is an indirect 
contribution to housing expenditures, uniformly provided across the regions. Being an 
entitlement of taxpayers who satisfy its prerequisites, this tax expenditure is not subject to a 
ceiling of revenue loss. Our tax-benefit microsimulation model, presented below, estimates that 
this credit could produce a revenue loss of about 750 million euros each year. This estimate is 
obtained assuming that all taxpayers with the requisites required by the law obtain the credit, i.e. 
by imposing full take-up. In the simulation, we take account of the different amounts of the 
credit for free and regulated contracts, and also of the greater sum for young tenants.  
 
 
The rent supplement scheme  
 
A first national scheme for a rent supplement was formally introduced in 1978, in the context of 
the “equo canone” (fair rent) regime, but was never implemented. Several cities experimented 
housing allowances during the 1990s as a policy instrument complementary to social housing 
provision. A national scheme was finally introduced in 1998, by the same law that liberalized the 
rented market, as an income-related form of housing support. 
The rent supplement is targeted towards poor households, generally distinguished into two 
groups for this purpose: the poorest comprises households with an income lower or equal to 
twice the minimum state pension (around 11,900 euros in 2010), while the other, less poor group 
consists of households eligible for social housing accommodation, according to the (higher) 
income criteria defined by each regional government. The allowance aims to increase the 
affordability of current leases in the private market. After receipt of the transfer, the rent-to-
income ratio cannot fall below 14% (for the first group of very poor households) and 24% (for 
households eligible for social housing). Ceilings exist also on the benefit available to individual 
beneficiaries, while more generous conditions apply for socially vulnerable households and those 
with “special needs”: households with many children or invalid or elderly members. Within this 
national framework, regional administrations and municipalities set their implementation criteria. 
These may differ in terms of procedures, eligibility norms, forms of means test and amount given 
to recipients. National funds are allocated to the regional administrations according to their 
estimated housing and affordability needs. These funds are often integrated by resources from 
the regional administrations and the municipalities
. In 2008, for example, the central government 
allocated 205.6 million euros for this transfer, which were then supplemented with 115.6 million 
from the Regions and 36.6 millions from the municipalities.  The latter represent the level of 
government responsible for the actual implementation of the benefit.  
The mechanism of the transfer can be summarised by this expression: 
 
TR = R – a Y, 
 
where R is market rent, Y is family income and a is the part of the rent, expressed as a percentage 
of Y, that the family must in any case pay: it is therefore 14% for the poorest group of tenants, 
and 24% for the other group. This formula, however, expresses only the theoretical scheme, 
because in practice the amount received by the household depends on the municipality-dedicated 
budget. In case of a reduction in the grants from central government or an increase in the number 
of applications, the municipality can react by cutting proportionally the transfer to all recipients, 
or by defining a fixed amount for each of the two groups of beneficiaries, or, lastly, by restricting 
the pool of recipients to the needier households. The amount effectively transferred to eligible 
households depends therefore on their income and rent, but also on the number of recipients who 
have to share the limited resources yearly allocated by the various levels of government. From   5
this point of view, the Italian housing allowance scheme is outside the European standards and 
more similar to the US housing voucher program (Kemp, 2007). 
Overall, as already mentioned, the functioning of this policy instrument is somewhat 
differentiated over the country. In some regions it is clearly presented as an alternative to social 
housing and tenants in this sector are not eligible. In other regions, where rents in the social 
housing sector have been set to about their market level, this benefit is considered 
complementary to social housing, so all tenants are eligible for the supplement. Local councils 
periodically open tenders for the rent supplement. The timing of existing procedures leads to 
housing allowances being transferred to beneficiaries a minimum of 1-2 years after the latter 
have paid the rents the benefit relates to. 
As for the measurement of the economic conditions of applicants, the 1998 law makes a generic 
reference to household income. Many Regions have actually opted for the sum of the incomes 
subject to the personal income tax of all family members, but some have preferred to use the 
Indicator of the Economic Situation (known in Italy as Ise, Indicatore della situazione 
economica), a measure introduced by another law of 1998, aimed at defining a new and uniform 
criterion to evaluate the economic conditions of all households that apply for welfare services. 
Ise aims to take into account not only income but also real and financial assets, at least to some 
extent (Baldini et al., 2002). Finally, due to limitations in data availability, in this paper we do 
not consider the possible effects of this benefit on the rents that its beneficiaries pay, that have 
been shown to be far from negligible in other countries (see Fack, 2006, for a review and for an 
assessment for France). The analysis is then focused on the formal and first-round distributive 
outcomes of the Italian housing allowances scheme. We have been unable to distinguish what is 
really received by the beneficiaries and whether landlords also benefit from this transfer, via rent 
increases, and to what extent in the latter case. While this relevant issue is left to further 
research, our study is still valuable. Evidence is provided below on the poor performance of 
housing allowances in Italy, as one of our main findings. Should further research provide 
evidence on the real benefits of the recipients being even less than what we have estimated, this 
would not contradict our main point: allowances seem a not very effective housing policy 
instrument in Italy. Clearly, further research could support more informed choices when 
considering the alternatives of, for example, providing more funds to this scheme as it is, or re-




The distributional impact of transfers for renters: evidence from survey data 
 
In this section we study the distributive impact of the three policy instruments for renters 
described above. The analysis is carried out on the 2006 It-Silc survey, the Italian section of the 
European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (Eu-Silc), containing information on the 
socio-demographic characteristics of Italian households referring to the year 2006, and on the 
incomes received during 2005. This sample is composed of 21,499 households. The It-Silc 
dataset is particularly useful for our purposes since it contains two questions specifically related 
to housing allowances: whether the household received housing allowances during 2005, and the 
amount received. It also provides information on the landlord, so that it is possible to single out 
those households living in the social housing sector. The use of this survey to study the tax credit 
for renters is, however, more problematic: the sample contains only information about net 
income, so the receipt of the tax credits cannot be directly computed. To this end, we 
reconstructed for each individual the amount of gross taxable income, using an iterative 
procedure. We then simulated the personal income tax at the individual level, considering also 
different propensities to evade for self-employed and dependent workers, computing all 
potentially available tax credits, including that reserved for renters. These steps were performed   6
within the set-up of a complete tax-benefit microsimulation model that allows the distributional 
impact of transfers and taxes on Italian households to be studied (Baldini and Toso, 2009). 
The unit of analysis of our simulations is the household, a choice imposed by reasons of 
consistency with the study of the administrative data that follows in the last part of the paper. 
The living standard is measured by household disposable equivalent income, obtained by 
dividing household disposable income by the modified OECD scale. We assume that all 
members of a household share the same level of economic welfare. Disposable income is 
computed by summing all money receipts obtained by the household. For the classification of 
households into deciles of disposable equivalent income, we consider the distribution of incomes 
after the receipt of the three transfers to tenants. All monetary amounts are expressed in 2009 
prices. To the disposable income of each household we then added the imputed rent for 
homeowners and the implicit transfer to tenants in the social sector. These amounts were 
estimated according to the method described below.  
While the amount received by each family for housing allowances is taken from the It-Silc 
questionnaire, and the tax credit for renters is simulated on the same data base, determining the 
benefit obtained by households living in social housing is more complex. The implicit benefit 
received from social housing is the difference between the rent that would have been paid in the 
free market and the rent actually paid. There are many methods to estimate this sum, described 
for example by D’Ambrosio and Gigliarano (2007, see also Frick and Grabka, 2003). In all 
cases, the market rent is estimated first, from which the rent really paid must be deducted. In this 
work we have opted for the opportunity cost method, that estimates the hypothetical market rent 
on the basis of the rents actually paid for dwellings with similar characteristics. We ran a hedonic 
linear regression on the subsample of households living in privately rented flats and paying 
market rents. The dependent variable is the log of rent per square meter, and the explanatory 
variables are the usual likely determinants of the price: year of building, number of rooms, size 
of the town, geographic area of residence, qualitative attributes of the flat, etc. From the 
estimated coefficients, we imputed a market rent to all households of the It-Silc data, except 
those in the private rental sector (no implicit returns or transfers derive from this tenure). 
Obtained market rents were used both to estimate the implicit subsidy deriving from living in the 
social housing sector and in order to take into account imputed rents for home owners and for 
those who can benefit from a rent-free accommodation. In the latter two cases, the costs for 
repair and maintenance and the extraordinary expenses for renovation were deducted, following 
the method used by D’Ambrosio and Gigliarano (2007). Interests paid on mortgages were also 
deducted, taking into account the 19% tax credit on them.  
Table 1 shows the distribution of households by deciles of equivalent income (if not differently 
specified, in this paper we consider income after inclusion of the three transfers for renters and of 
imputed rents for homeowners and rent-free dwellings) and by tenure status. The last row 
contains the distribution of households among the four tenure statuses. Tenants are clearly 








Tab. 1 Distribution of households by deciles of equivalent disposable income and tenure status.  
 Tenants  Owners  Usufruct 
Accomodation 
provided free 
1 21.02%  6.83%  7.76%  12.39% 
2 15.09%  8.53%  9.43%  10.98% 
3 11.86%  9.11%  13.58%  11.47% 
4  11.74%  9.39% 13.9% 9.63%   7
5  9.99%  9.93% 11.59% 9.89% 
6  7.89%  10.38% 10.91% 10.98% 
7 6.81%  11.05%  10.37%  8.55% 
8 6.49%  11.09%  8.07%  9.62% 
9 5.09%  11.57%  7.94%  8.94% 
10 4.01%  12.14%  6.46%  7.54% 
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 
% of all Italian households  18.25%  68.33%  3.53%  9.89% 
Note: as for all other tables of this section, households are classified in deciles computed over the total distribution 
of households in Italy, including both renters and owners. 
 
 
Information on how many households benefit from each of the three housing transfers is 
provided in Table 2, considering only the subsample of tenants. The tax credit is by far the most 
widely used benefit for tenants — at least hypothetically, since it is a new instrument — being 
received by about three out of five million renter households. It is also fairly well distributed 
across the income deciles. The implicit subsidy provided by social housing is distributed in a 
way that does not correspond to many prior beliefs: even if the share of tenants in social housing 
is greater in the bottom half of the population of renters, the income gradient of beneficiaries is 
not very steep. The low turnover rates, which can be explained also by widespread 
administrative inefficiencies, at least in some parts of the country, allow many households to 
remain in the social housing sector even if they are not poor. The rent supplement is received by 
a tiny minority of tenants, around 5%. Many of its beneficiaries are in the first deciles.  
Housing allowances cover a very small share of households in the rental segment when 
compared to other European countries. Recipients of housing related transfers are in fact about 
10% of all tenants in Germany and more than 30% in the Netherlands and Sweden; housing 
benefits cover about one quarter of the tenants in the UK private market (Haffner and 
Boelhouwer, 2006). In Italy, this marginal housing support via transfers goes hand in hand with 
the limited role of social housing already discussed. 
 
 Tab. 2 Share of renters receiving each transfer, by deciles of equivalent disposable income 
  Social housing  Rent supplement  Tax credit 
1  16.99% 8.40% 58.11% 
2  23.99% 8.77% 68.53% 
3  24.82% 4.84% 66.59% 
4  20.72% 4.59% 62.29% 
5  22.44% 1.07% 62.82% 
6  24.66% 4.08% 59.75% 
7  16.17% 2.73% 55.53% 
8  13.42% 5.02% 49.07% 
9  17.62% 1.51% 28.86% 
10  10.96% 0.00% 10.47% 
% of all renters  20.07% 5.22% 57.62% 
% of all Italian households  3.66% 0.95%  10.51% 
 
Table 3 provides evidence on the percentage incidence of the transfers on disposable income 
(defined, as always, after the receipt of all the considered benefits for renters and imputed rents 
for the others), still only for tenant households, that are allocated in the deciles computed over 
the entire income distribution. The table also contains the average rent paid, as a share of 
disposable income. Overall, rents represent, for all tenants, 19.6% of their disposable income. 
This share reaches 42.9% for renters belonging to the first decile of the total distribution, and 
10.8% for the top one. The sum of the three transfers targeted to renters is 7.8% of disposable 
income for the first decile, 0.7% for the tenth. The “hypothetical” rent is the amount that tenants 
would pay without considering also the subsidy implicit in social housing. This is therefore the   8
burden of rents on disposable incomes without public intervention. Column g contains the rents 
actually paid, always as a percentage of disposable income (the difference between colums e and 
f is therefore given by social housing). Then follows the remaining burden from rents, after the 
deduction of the three benefits. The last column is the % reduction in the hypothetical rent 
realized by the transfers. Taken together, these three instruments reduce the incidence of rent on 
income from 47% to 39.2% for the bottom decile (a 20% reduction), and from 21.9% to 18.5% 
for the whole sample of tenants. Turning to each of the three subsidies, social housing has by far 
the greatest effect, since it represents about two thirds of total transfers for renters, then follows 
the tax credit, and finally the rent supplement, that presents a very low incidence, owing to its 
small number of beneficiaries and — as discussed below — to the limited funds available.  
 
Tab. 3 Incidence of transfers on disposable income by deciles, tenants only 
 a b  c  d  e f g  H 
























1  4.52% 0.75% 2.56%  7.84% 47.02%  42.92% 39.18%  -20.01% 
2  3.61% 0.61% 1.51%  5.73% 27.32%  23.75% 21.58%  -26.56% 
3  4.08% 0.22% 1.46%  5.76% 25.97%  22.07% 20.22%  -28.47% 
4  2.98% 0.25% 0.90%  4.13% 23.89%  20.96% 19.76%  -20.89% 
5  2.85% 0.07% 0.66%  3.58% 22.40%  19.77% 18.82%  -19.04% 
6  2.44% 0.17% 0.52%  3.13% 18.96%  16.52% 15.83%  -19.79% 
7  1.56% 0.08% 0.44%  2.08% 16.73%  15.20% 14.66%  -14.17% 
8  1.25% 0.08% 0.34%  1.66% 17.04%  15.83% 15.38%  -10.82% 
9  1.20% 0.05% 0.20%  1.45% 15.23%  14.04% 13.78%  -10.53% 
10  0.71% 0.00% 0.02%  0.73% 11.46%  10.76% 10.73%  -6.85% 
Total  2.45% 0.21% 0.81%  3.47% 21.94%  19.58% 18.47%  -18.79% 
Note: incidence is computed on all renters, not only on households receiving each benefit. 
 
 
All the benefits for renters perform well in terms of targeting low incomes. Their vertical 
expenditure efficiency, i.e. the share of each transfer that goes to the poor, defined on the basis of 
a poverty line computed on incomes before the receipt of the three transfers for renters, is high: 
44% for both social housing and the tax credit and 59% for the rent supplement.  
 
Despite a good targeting, transfers for renters have a modest impact on inequality and on the 
levels of poverty tied to housing conditions. Starting from the share of households that are poor 
in terms of disposable equivalent income before housing costs (i.e., monetary income for renters, 
monetary income plus imputed rents for homeowners and those in rent-free dwellings), Table 4 
shows the impact of the three measures for renters on the diffusion and intensity of poverty. The 
indexes of the second row are computed after subtracting from income the housing costs (rents 
for tenants, imputed rents for owners), and therefore show the effect of housing costs on poverty 
and inequality. The third line adds to these incomes the three transfers for renters, thus 
evaluating their impact on poverty produced by housing costs: they reduce overall poverty very 
marginally, and poverty among tenants by 3.5 percentage points — not very much, considering 
their high poverty levels. Finally, for reference, the last line shows the indexes computed 
according to the standard income definition (that we followed in constructing the deciles), i.e. 
monetary income plus imputed rents and benefits, without subtracting rents paid by tenants. 
Given that the transfers for renters have an appreciable targeting, the reason for their small 
impact on poverty rates lies in the limited amount of resources invested.  
   9
 
Tab. 4  Impact of transfers for renters on income poverty and inequality 
 All  households  Tenants  Gini, all 
households 
  Head 
count  Intensity  Head 
count  Intensity  
Before housing costs and transfers for renters  19.00% 30.59% 24.63% 32.77%  0.3218 
After housing costs but before transfers for renters  20.26% 35.40% 39.24% 44.51%  0.3376 
After housing costs and transfers for renters  19.87% 34.76% 35.67% 43.94%  0.3342 
Disposable income, standard definition   16.59% 28.23% 31.98% 31.97%  0.3006 
 
 
The impact of the three subsidies differs markedly also across non-income dimensions. When 
considering the age of the recipients, the probability of benefiting from social housing is much 
greater for older households, while 63% of total tax expenditure for the tax credit goes to 
households whose reference person is younger than 50 (not shown). The rent supplement is, as 
well, more targeted in favour of young households. The presence of a disabled person strongly 
increases the probability of being in social housing, while the reverse is true for households with 
a reference person born abroad.  
 
The total value of resources transferred to renters with the three schemes can be estimated at 
about 3.7 billion euros per year (72% social housing, 7% rent supplement and 21% tax credit). 
According to the evidence so far described, this amount is not sufficient to reduce poverty levels 
significantly. But tenants in Italy are a subset of the population with low average incomes, so it 
may be excessive to require these transfers to have a non-marginal effect on their poverty risk. 
They are, in fact, dedicated housing policy instruments and not income maintenance ones, even 
if these two policy issues are clearly connected. We can pose a more pertinent question: are these 
transfers sufficient to significantly relieve the burden of rents on family budgets? After setting a 
conventional threshold that defines a “sustainable” ratio between rent and monetary income, e.g. 
25%, how much resources would be necessary, in addition to those already invested, in order to 
bring middle and low income tenants below this level? Before transfers, around 27% of tenants 
in the first 5 deciles would pay more than 25% of their income in rents. After the three transfers, 
this share falls to 23%, a marginal reduction consistent with previous results. If we want to 
increase the transfers to the tenants below median income so as to reduce the rent-to-income 
ratio to 25% for all of them, it turns out that it would be necessary to directly or indirectly 
dedicate an additional flow of around 3.2 billion euros more each year. This supplementary 
transfer would still have limited effects on the levels of poverty and inequality (the overall 
headcount ratio, for example, would fall only from 16.6% to 16.2%). This amount must also be 
considered as a minimal sum, for at least two reasons: firstly, it assumes a 100% targeting, while 
each reinforcement of the existing measures would at least partly benefit also some households 
in the top 50% of the income distribution; secondly, if in the near future new policies to increase 
the supply of houses for rent are introduced, as many propose, the number of households opting 





The distributional impact of the rent supplement scheme: evidence from register data 
 
The It-Silc survey enables the distributive outcomes of the rent supplement at the national level 
to be studied. However, the number of recipients within the It-Silc sample does not permit a 
more detailed analysis of its effects across different areas. Since it is administered by local 
governments, some differences may likely emerge with more disaggregated data. The register   10
data of applicants and recipients therefore represent an alternative source of great interest. They 
allow a more detailed analysis of the social composition of the rent supplement recipients and of 
the distributive outcomes of this allowance. They also enable differences across the regions in 
the rent supplement implementation to be taken into account. 
Despite their great analytical potential, problems and limitations also occur when using register 
data: access to the data themselves is not granted, they are not always stored in digital data bases 
and — when they are — different standards may have been applied. Furthermore, there is a weak 
tradition in Italy in the use of register micro-level data for social and economic research. Access 
to the data needs to be negotiated with each local authority and their quality must be assessed. As 
already mentioned, differences in the implementation across regions and municipalities exist and 
are likely to have an effect on the data structure and quality. Data harmonization is hence an 
issue. Considering both analytic potentialities and mentioned problems, we collected 
administrative data on the recipients of the rent subsidy living in 9 major Italian cities: Milan, 
Turin, Genoa, Venice, Bologna, Florence, Naples, Bari, Catania (for different reasons we could 
not obtain data from the other contacted cities: Rome, Palermo, Messina and Verona). The 
choice to focus on the largest cities comes from both research concerns and practical constraints: 
the share of tenants is greater in urban areas — where housing problems are also concentrated — 
than in the rest of Italy; the geographical distribution of these cities affords some substantive 
representativeness of the different national contexts and implementation approaches; the choice 
to focus on the major cities simplifies both bargaining access to the municipalities’ archives and 
data harmonization.  
The data that we have collected so far cover variable time periods for the different towns
2. The 
statistics we present refer to the most recent available year for each town, at constant 2009 
prices. Data we gained access to provide information on applicants’ characteristics and their 
household composition, on their economic conditions, on the rent paid and the housing 
allowance they have received.  
In analysing this alternative data source, we try to answer two questions. Firstly, do these data 
broadly confirm the results obtained for the rent supplement on the basis of the It-Silc survey? 
Secondly, which additional insights do these more detailed data provide, in particular in terms of 
difference in implementation and results across municipalities? Table 5 contains a series of 
statistics computed on the administrative records of the various towns. The first row shows the 
total number of households living in rented dwellings, computed applying the percentage of 
renters from the 2001 Census to the total number of households in each town, obtained from 
Istat
3. The table, except for the first row, refers only to the transfer recipients. The share of tenant 
households who receive the rent supplement is in general low (row 3), thus confirming the 
limited diffusion of this instrument observed on the It-Silc sample. There are however relevant 
differences across the cities: in Milan, for example, the probability of receiving this transfer is 
less than half that for tenants living in Turin, and a third of that relative to Bologna. The average 
amounts received by each beneficiary (row 4) are negatively correlated with these incidences: 
some municipalities (for example Milan, Florence and Naples) have preferred to concentrate the 
subsidy to only a few tenants, those most in need, and to transfer to them relatively high average 
amounts. Others, like Turin, Bologna or Bari, have preferred to enlarge the pool of beneficiaries, 




                                                 
2 For Milan, we have data for 2006 and 2007; for Turin, the period covered is 2003-2005; Bologna: 2000-2006; 
Genoa: 2005-2006; Venice: 2004-2005; Florence: 2004-2007, Naples: 2000-2002; Bari: 2003-2006; Catania: 2002-
2005.  
3 We use the number of households estimated by Istat (http://demo.istat.it, bilancio demografico) for the years 
referring to the data we use (2007 for Milan and Florence, 2006 for Bologna and Bari, 2005 for Turin, Genoa and 
Catania, 2004 for Venice, 2002 for Naples).   11
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Tab. 5 Indicators for the rent supplement scheme in selected cities 
 Milan  Turin  Genoa  Venice  Bologna Florence  Naples  Bari  Catania
 (2007)  (2005)  (2005)  (2004)  (2006)  (2007)  (2002)  (2006)  (2005) 
1. N. tenant households  233,881 138,765  73,413  31,434  57,735  42,449  162,337  37,021  41,515 
2. N. households receiving the rent supplement 8,109  11,187  3,199  2,060 6,084 963  7,579  6,276  2,053 
3. % tenant households receiving the rent supplement  3.5% 8.1%  4.4%  6.5% 10.5% 2.3%  4.7%  17.0%  4.9% 
4. Average yearly transfer for to each beneficiary  1,723  1,032 1,153  2,472  1,083 1,948 1,592  836  675 
5. Average yearly rent paid by each beneficiary  6,538  4,034  4,625 
+ 5,797 6,675  7,245  4,058  3,872  3,230 
6. Average taxable income of households receiving the transfer  11,634  9,372 7,864  11,224  15,361  10,214 5,464  9,355 9,257 
7. Average transfer / average rent  26.4%  25.6%  24.9%  42.6%  16.2%  26.9%  39.2%  21.6%  20.9% 
8. Average transfer / average taxable income  14.8%  11.0%  14.7%  22.0%  7.1%  19.1%  29.1%  8.9%  7.3% 
9. Average rent / average taxable income  56.2%  43.0% 58.8%  51.6%  43.5%  70.9%  74.3% 41.4%  34.9% 
10. (average rent – average transfer) / average taxable income 
  41.4% 32.0%  44.2%  29.6% 36.4% 51.9%  45.1%  32.5% 27.6% 
11. % recipient households that belong to the first decile 38.2%  40.3%  50.4%  32.4%  15.5%  47.1%  76.2%  51.35% n.a. 
12. % of total expenditure to the first decile  58.3% 46.4%  55.5%  39.2% 18.3% 46.4%  77.7%  58.6% n.a. 
13. % recipient households that are poor before the transfer 77.4%  81.0%  84.1%  77.7%  46.1%  87.6%  94.7%  88.3%  n.a. 
14. % recipient households that remain poor after the transfer 71.9%  76.1%  79.8%  61.6%  40.6%  77.9%  92.5%  86.2%  n.a. 
15. Reduction in the incidence of poverty among  beneficiaries 
(percentage points)  -5.5 -4.9  -4.3  -16.1  -5.5 -9.7  -2.2  -2.1%  n.a. 
16. %  households with applicants aged more than 60 years   24.0%  38.4%  44.8%  42.8%  21.6%  n.a.  28.0%  29.5%  28.4% 
17. % households with applicant born abroad  60.0%  26.5% 25.6%  23.6%  39.0%  n.a.  0.8%  7.6%  6.0% 
18. Average number of components  2.4  2.0  2.1  2.2  1.9  2.1  3.2  2.7  n.a. 
19. % Recipient households in overcrowded dwellings ***  28.8%  n.a.  n.a.  * 9.2%  ** 9.8% 13.3% n.a.  21.0%  n.a. 
20. % Recipients who received the benefit the year before (%) 65.9%  82.2%  n.a. *66.4%  69.9% 63.0% 60.1% 78.6%  68.1% 
Notes: Estimates for years * 2005 and **2004. *** A dwelling is defined overcrowded if : 1-2 individuals live in less than 30 m
2; 3 in less than 50 m
2; 4 in less than 65 m
2; 5-6 in less than 80 m
2; 7 in less than 95 m
2; 8 or more 
individuals in less than 110 m
2. For households of Catania information is available only on the number of children, so we could not compute the statistics based on equivalent incomes or the total number of members.  
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The transfer covers, on average, a very variable share of the yearly rent (row 7): it reaches almost 
40% in Naples, but is only 16% in Bologna and about 21% in Bari and Catania. Likewise, it is a 
significant share of total household taxable income in some cases (row 8, in particular in Naples) 
but falls to less than 10% in other cases (Bari and Catania). Row 8 corresponds also to the 
percentage reduction in the burden of rent on taxable income allowed by the rent supplement. 
The next two rows show the incidence of the rent on income, before and after the transfer.  
Howfar is this benefit targeted to the poor? We used the It-Silc data to compute the levels of 
equivalent taxable income that split Italian households into deciles, and on this basis we checked 
— for each town — how many beneficiaries are in the first decile of the Italian income 
distribution and the share of the rent supplement expenditures in the municipality targeted to the 
first decile (rows 11 and 12, respectively). There is a wide variation in the degree of targeting, 
generally higher in the towns of the Centre-South, and lower in the North. This result is partly 
due to the fact that average incomes are somewhat different across Italian regions, but 
differences still remain across urban areas with similar living standards: e.g. in Florence 46% of 
the beneficiaries belong to the poorest 10% of Italian households, while in the nearby town of 
Bologna this share falls to only 14%.  The high degree of targeting is confirmed by the fact that 
most of the beneficiaries are poor, with a poverty line defined as 60% of the national median of 
taxable equivalent household income (row 13). The outlier here is again the town of Bologna. 
Recipients living in the North are less poor than those in the southern towns, since the share of 
beneficiaries that exit from poverty after the transfer is higher in the former group (rows 14 and 
15).  
Rows 16-18 provide evidence on some demographic characteristics of beneficiaries, in particular 
the age and place of birth of the person who has applied for it, and family size. Genoa has a 
population significantly older than the other big towns, so it is not surprising that the age 
distribution of the allowance is skewed towards the elderly. In Naples, on the other hand, there 
are a lot of poor families with children, so the age composition of the beneficiaries is very 
different from that prevailing in the North. Like social housing, the housing allowance is often 
accused of being increasingly directed towards poor immigrants, who could have a preferential 
access to this subsidy given their frequent characteristics of low incomes and high number of 
family members. In general, immigrants account for a very high share of total beneficiaries in 
Milan and also in Bologna, while they represent a quarter of total beneficiaries in the rest of the 
North. These shares are also steadily increasing over time (not shown). In the Southern towns the 
participation of foreign-born households in this scheme is negligible, consistently with the strong 
concentration of immigrants in Northern (and Central) Italy.  
It should be noted, however, that foreign households are well over-represented in the rental 
sector. Furthermore, in many regions several criteria seem to discriminate against immigrants in 
the allocation of social housing, ranging from “residence seniority” scoring to ex-ante quoting of 
dwellings available for foreign citizens. These factors may explain their notable incidence among 
the beneficiaries of the rent supplement. 
In the debate on the pros and the cons of the demand-side housing policy instruments versus the 
supply side ones, two issues are particularly relevant: the targeting to those more in need, and the 
ability to deal with changes over time of economic and housing conditions (Adams, 1990; 
Haffner & Boelhouwer, 2006). While supply-side policies are considered to have largely 
contributed to the improvement of housing conditions, they are also accused of subsidizing 
bricks-and-mortar, instead of households: except perhaps when a social housing dwelling is 
originally allocated, there is no guarantee that this form of support is optimally allocated to those 
most in need, as social and economic circumstances vary along the life span. This may also lead 
to poverty traps and disincentive effects. Housing allowances are expected to better target poor 
households and to better deal with their time-variant social and economic circumstances, even if 
they are not exempt from the risk of creating possible poverty traps and of discouraging work 
effort, given their inverse correlation with family income. Furthermore, it is generally assumed   14
— with good reason — that housing affordability is today a core issue whereas bad housing 
conditions are often merely a residual heritage from the past. In this perspective, the welfare state 
should better support incomes via specific transfers to be spent on the housing market, able to 
provide good housing conditions and to match supply and demand. 
Register data provide the opportunity for a first discussion on these issues. One preliminary way 
to address the possible “dependence” on the benefit, given our very short time series for each 
city, is to consider the share of recipients who benefited from the rent supplement the year before 
the one considered (row 20). Households receiving the allowance for the second (or more) 
consecutive year range from 60% to 80% of beneficiaries. This marks a not-negligible degree of 
persistence that would deserve further investigation. However, the limitations of income 
maintenance policies and the lack of opportunities in the labor market of the South suggest that 
such persistence may depend on the poorest of the poor being housing allowance recipients.  
As regards housing conditions, we were able to analyze the level of overcrowding among 
beneficiaries, for some of the cities considered (row 19). The incidence of this problem varies 
across the municipalities, ranging from 9% in Venice and Bologna to 28% in Milan. These 
figures confirm the persistence — even if with a small incidence and considering only 
overcrowding — of poor housing conditions in Italian cities and their overlap with economic 
poverty. The capacity of housing allowances to deal with this problem, in the context of the 





The evidence gathered shows that all transfers for renters are concentrated towards the poorer 
section of the income distribution. This characteristic depends not only on their design but also 
on the fact that many tenants are poor. A policy addressed towards renters has therefore by 
definition a good degree of target efficiency.  
The main problem of the current transfers lies in the limited resources now devoted to them, 
insufficient not only to significantly reduce poverty levels across tenants — it can be argued that 
income maintenance policies should pursue this general objective — but even to reduce the 
burden of rents for poor and middle-income households within reasonably affordable limits. 
While the distributive impacts are similar for the three measures, their generational effects are 
very different: social housing favours older households, largely because of the drastic contraction 
in the supply of new dwellings in the last twenty years, coupled with low turnover rates, while 
the rent supplement is more concentrated towards younger households but reaches a very limited 
share of tenants. Results from register data corroborate the evidence obtained on the basis of the 
It-Silc survey, in particular the limited incidence of the rent supplement scheme among the 
tenants, but also its good target efficiency. However, they highlight also important differences in 
the implementation and the results of the scheme across Italian towns. Furthermore, when 
considering both “dependence” on this benefit and recipients’ housing conditions, some other 
criticalities emerge for this policy instrument. 
Social housing is an in-kind transfer whose main current limitation is the substantial stalemate of 
the whole sector, due to lack of resources for new investments. An extensive debate is now 
ongoing about possible alternatives to the traditional model of funding from central government 
and implementation by local authorities. The objective is to find new criteria and subjects that 
may promote innovative forms of supply. 
As for the two other transfers for renters, the recent strengthening of the tax credit has generated 
the problem of its coordination with the rent supplement. They have very different structures. 
The rent supplement depends on the total resources of the family, while the tax credit depends on 
the individual income of the taxpayer who signed the rental contract. The first is administered by 
Regions and municipalities, has great admimistrative costs and is not an entitlement, while the   15
second is part of the personal income tax and is guaranteed to all taxpayers who fulfil its 
conditions.  
We can imagine different solutions to coordinate the two schemes. The first is the elimination of 
one of them and its absorption into the other. The abolition of the rent supplement would 
translate into an increase in poverty, since it reaches poorer households than those receiving the 
credit. Conversely, the abolition of the tax credit and the expansion of the rent supplement could 
reduce poverty, but with a welfare loss for many households who, albeit not poor, are exposed to 
an increasing burden of rents, given the stagnating dynamics of incomes.  
Since the rent supplement and the tax credit reach different households, the elimination of one or 
the other is not advisable. One could instead distinguish more clearly between them, in terms of 
their functions. The tax credit should have the objective of horizontal equity, consistent with its 
position within the personal income tax. It should counterbalance, for renters, the advantage 
given to owners by the exclusion of the imputed income of the house from the tax base. The rent 
supplement, on the other hand, should have a vertical equity aim, i.e. the reduction of the rent 
burden for tenants with low incomes.  
The main current problem of the rent supplement is now its low and falling endowment. With the 
caveat of possible inflationary effects, that must be investigated, a greater effort in this direction 
could, thanks to its strong efficiency, have a significant impact on the living standards of low-
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